Revista de Matemática: Teoría y Aplicaciones ISSN Impreso: 1409-2433 ISSN electrónico: 2215-3373

OAI: https://www.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/matematica/oai
Optimal control of pollution stock through ecological interaction of the manufacturer and the state
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Keywords

optimal control
nonlinear model
environmental problem
control óptimo
modelo no lineal
problema ambiental

How to Cite

Grigorieva, E. V., Khailov, E. N., & Kharitonova, E. I. (2011). Optimal control of pollution stock through ecological interaction of the manufacturer and the state. Revista De Matemática: Teoría Y Aplicaciones, 18(1), 11–110. https://doi.org/10.15517/rmta.v18i1.2116

Abstract

A model of an interaction between a manufacturer and the state where the manufacturer produces a single product and the state controls the level of pollution is created and investigated. A local economy with a stock pollution problem that must choose between productive and environmental investments (control functions) is considered. The model is described by a nonlinear system of two differential equations with two bounded controls. The best optimal strategy is found analytically with the use of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle and Green’s Theorem.

https://doi.org/10.15517/rmta.v18i1.2116
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