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Nietzsche’s Ideal of Wholeness

Resumen: En este trabajo investigo el ideal de Nietzsche de completud o de unidad. El consenso entre los analistas es que este ideal consiste en el logro de una integración psíquica dentro de la persona a través de la cual las diversas partes que conforman la mente del agente son reestructuradas de forma tal que se vuelvan un conjunto armonioso. En contraste, sostengo que la completud Nietzscheana se refiere a la integración cultural: una persona alcanza la completud persiguiendo el ideal de la libertad y de la humanidad en sí mismo y en todos, un ideal que transcende fronteras nacionales y que es de alcance universal. Para Nietzsche, la búsqueda de este ideal hace que una persona se convierta en un pedazo de fatalidad o de ley primaria, es decir, hace que se vuelva necesario para todo lo que es y está por venir. De esta forma, la persona que alcanza la completud logra redimirse del sinsentido de la existencia. En vez de permitir que su vida se convierta en un puro acto de azar carente de pensamiento, esta persona proyecta sus energías hacia el futuro en la forma del propio ideal por el cual luchó y que aspiró a realizar mientras estuvo vivo – un ideal que está siendo constantemente renovado y garantizado para todos dentro de la comunidad suprapersonal que componen los auténticos luchadores de la cultura que alcanzaron la completud.


Summary: In this paper I investigate Nietzsche’s ideal of wholeness or unity. The consensus among commentators is that this ideal consists in the achievement of psychic integration in a person whereby the various parts of the agent’s mind are restructured into a harmonious whole. Against this prevalent reading, I argue that Nietzschean wholeness concerns cultural integration: a person becomes whole by pursuing the ideal of freedom and humanity in himself and in all, an ideal that transcends national boundaries and that is universal in scope. For Nietzsche, the pursuit of this ideal makes a person into a piece of fate or primal law, that is, it makes him necessary for all that is and that is yet to come. In this way, the person who becomes whole finds redemption from the meaninglessness of existence. Instead of allowing his life to become a mindless act of chance, this person manages to project his energies into the future in the form of the very ideal he fought and aspired to realize while alive – an ideal that is being perpetually renewed and guaranteed for all within the suprapersonal community that is made up of those genuine fighters of culture who became whole.


1. Introduction: the ideal of wholeness

In some places throughout his published works Nietzsche appears to recommend an ideal of wholeness or unity to his readers. The consensus among most commentators is that this ideal consists in some kind of psychic unity or integration in the agent. Additionally, the
debate surrounding this notion has principally centered on determining whether, in Nietzsche’s mind, wholeness (or unity) is a sufficient or merely a necessary condition for free agency, or whether the reverse is true (freedom a condition for wholeness), or, indeed, whether there is no relation between the two. In this paper I will construct a different interpretation of this ideal based on Nietzsche’s preoccupation with it in his, often neglected, early works. Commentators tend to disregard these works on the assumption that Nietzsche changed his mind in significant ways and later disavowed most of his beliefs on important subjects of metaphysics, agency, and the like. Rather than argue against this assumption, I will show that investigating the earlier works illuminates important aspects of the Nietzschean ideal of wholeness as it appears in his later writings, and helps us understand better its relation to the cluster of concepts that surround it in those later works, such as the concepts of “necessity” and “fate”.

My argument will proceed in five stages. In section 2, I will first approach the Nietzschean ideal of wholeness negatively by an analysis of the weak or fragmented personality that Nietzsche considers to be its opposite. For Nietzsche, weakness of personality is a disease of the will that consists in a person’s incapacity to manifest his unique spirit or inwardness, what he dubs his “content”, in genuine creative action, what he calls his “form”. It is, thus, a failure to forge what Nietzsche describes as a living unity of content and form. In section 3, I argue that this living unity is achieved when the person stops responding to his false needs and, instead, attempts to actively satisfy his true needs, which correspond to the needs of his freedom or autonomy. According to Nietzsche, when this happens, the relation between the person’s content and his form becomes necessary. In section 4, I thus argue that this notion of necessity is not opposed to freedom, but actually signals its achievement in the form of a person who has regained control of his life and his actions by wrestling them out of nature’s contingent and unguided stream of becoming. This wrestling itself is made possible by the agent’s pursuit of a goal (and an ideal) that is necessarily authoritative for him, in the sense that he realizes he cannot fail to pursue it if he ever wants to become whole. In section 5, I argue that, for Nietzsche, this goal is the procreation of the genius or the free personality and that therefore wholeness consists in an act whereby we attempt to promote freedom in ourselves and in all. The purpose of this act is to bring together into a higher unity the things in the world that were thought to be irreconcilable, and that keep us estranged from each other and from the ideal of freedom that we all share in common. I thus argue that the secondary literature has been wrong in characterizing this ideal as a matter of psychic integration in the agent. Finally, in section 6, I conclude by suggesting that my reading of wholeness can be used to make better sense of Nietzsche’s, often cryptic, pronouncements about wholeness and necessity in his late philosophy.

2. Weakness and fragmentation

Although in the early works the notion of wholeness is prominent mainly in the Untimely Meditations, the idea is not altogether absent from The Birth of Tragedy. There it occurs in descriptions of the phenomenon of the Dionysian: an artistic, religious, and metaphysical element of reality in which the person is stripped of his individuality and is absorbed back into the undifferentiated stream of becoming, where he finds redemption in a mystic feeling of unity with nature and his fellow men (BT 8, 10, 17, 21, and 22). Since it would take me too far afield, I will not discuss the appearance of wholeness in Birth, even though this is generally considered to be the most important book of Nietzsche’s early period. Let me just say that, in my mind, what links Nietzsche’s various discussions of wholeness in all the early works is their connection to the theme of redemption: wholeness is what gives meaning and justifies the individual person’s life, furnishing some type of consolation in the face of the absurdity of existence and death. This provides an important clue for understanding the ideal of wholeness and I will return to it later.

In the First Meditation, the concept of unity appears briefly, but significantly, in Nietzsche’s
strange thesis that “culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people” (UM I.1, 5). Nietzsche uses this definition to castigate the false complacency of the “cultivated” German nationalists who were convinced that world events (the foundation of the second German Reich and the triumph over the French in the Franco-Prussian war) had proven the superiority of their culture and had vindicated the greatness of German tastes and ideas. Against these conceited and self-deluded chauvinists, Nietzsche argued that there was no culture to speak of in Germany. Instead, he claimed, one found a fragmented and pastiche society, resting merely on empty forms and incapable of giving expression to any genuine inwardness.

Although in this first meditation Nietzsche does not really explain what he means by his somewhat cryptic definition of culture, he reaffirms it again in the next meditation, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; this time warning us not to misunderstand this definition as implying an antithesis between beautiful and barbaric style, as if having a culture meant simply exhibiting a uniformity of pleasing and beautiful modes of aesthetic expression (beautiful forms). This constitutes a superficial way of rendering the thesis. Instead, Nietzsche insists that “what is meant [by this thesis] is that a people to whom one attributes a culture has to be in all reality a single living unity and not fall wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form” (UM II.4, 80; emphasis added). What does Nietzsche mean by this statement? And how can one tell whether a living unity among content and form has been achieved? Interestingly, Nietzsche discusses these issues in the context of furthering the indictment that “cultivated” Germans and German culture in general suffer from a “weak personality”. What defines this weakness in personality is precisely the antithesis between interior and exterior: to be weak is to incarnate a being in which content and form fail to correspond to one another (UM II.4, 80).  

How exactly does this failure of correspondence manifest itself? The answer Nietzsche gives to this question in the Second Meditation is bound up with a complicated argument about history and its relation to the individual human being, as it has come to be understood and practiced by modern historians. I cannot do full justice to that argument in the space of this essay. For our purposes it suffices to say that, in essence, Nietzsche’s quarrel with contemporary historians in this work boils down to the claim that they pose a real threat to life because they have made history into a positivistic science that is concerned with knowledge of the past for its own sake: modern historians have transformed history into an exercise for weak individuals that resemble walking corpses (Ibid). For Nietzsche, these individuals reveal their weakness in their incapacity to put history into creative use and in their tendency to turn the past into a creative wasteland; their weakness is a kind of impotence of the will. As he provocingly puts it, “this is a race of eunuchs, and to a eunuch one woman is like another, simply a woman, woman in herself” (UM II.5, 86).

The sexual language and innuendo that Nietzsche employs here is no accident. It anticipates one of his most widely discussed statements; and one that, from the preface, launches the reader’s initial voyage into the book Beyond Good and Evil, setting the tone and serving as backdrop for the whole work: “Supposing truth is a woman—what then?” (BGE, Preface). The statement of the early work is the inchoate form, not only of this later and more famous formulation, but also of Nietzsche’s infamous use of the trope of woman in general to refer to things like life, truth, eternity, and wisdom. I call attention to this theme because I think that the trope’s early appearance is very telling and can help us understand better the full import of the metaphor. No commentator fails to emphasize the sexual underpinning of the symbol Nietzsche intends here, but usually this is interpreted along epistemological and metaphysical lines: the point of the parallel, it is argued, is to show that philosophers and men of knowledge in general have been clumsy lovers because they approach reality dogmatically, as if there were some substratum behind it that could be apprehended fully and revealed in its true nakedness. Scientists and philosophers fail to realize the fundamental womanly nature of
realities, which is in constant flux and consist in an infinite veiling and play of appearances. In misapprehending this nature, so we are told, they reveal themselves to be bad suitors of truth and life in general. In other words, from this quite prevalent interpretative angle, the point of the metaphor is to highlight the epistemic and metaphysical inadequacies of philosophers as the ones responsible for their sexual inadequacies, for their failure to satisfy the woman that truth is (or vice versa: their sexual ineptitude as the one responsible for their epistemic and metaphysical shortcomings in philosophizing). What is missing here is the emphasis on the procreative aspect of sex that in the early works, but also, as I believe, in the later ones, the original formulation of the metaphor carries with it, and that is the real lynchpin on which the symbolism turns. The trope is not so much about the sexual encounter per se and thus not really about the inadequacy of philosophers in performing purely sexually (in philosophizing about truth), but rather about their ineptitude in pro-creating, in giving truth what, according to Nietzsche, she really wants, namely, a child. This is the point of the indictment of historians as eunuchs: history, historical truth (but also any truth: scientific, moral, psychological, and so on) is a woman that wants a pursuer who will inseminate her and help her give birth to the future; and that is precisely what eunuchs could never do for her, even if they somehow managed to overcome their handicap and succeed by other means at pleasing her sexually.

We have thus a first indication of what it means to be a weak or fragmented individual: it is to be incapable of the sort of action that guarantees the future, it is to have one’s will and one’s creative capacity compromised in a way that leads either to total infertility or, in the best case, to projects that end in miscarriage. Of course, suggestive as this might be, it still does not help us to understand what it would mean to act so as to guarantee the future, to act in a way that would indicate a strong and unified personality. Nonetheless, identifying the weakness of personality with a disease of the will sets us on the right course to grasp what the healthy manifestation of the will may be, so it is worth delving into this a bit further. In the Second Meditation Nietzsche attempts to diagnose the various ways in which this disease of the will afflicts modern man’s relation to history. I will touch on two of the most important ones he discusses. The first concerns methodological aspects of this relation, whereas the second has to do with our way of conceptualizing it.

On the methodological front, Nietzsche decrees the modern historian’s support of a mistaken notion of “objectivity” and his preoccupation with the mere accumulation of facts (UM II.5, 84; also UM II.6, 89-91). Both elements are intimately related to each other. According to this model the historian should be a dispassionate spectator of past and present events; he should capture them as they happened or are happening without ever interposing his own subjectivity (or personality) in the matter. His operations should be like those of a photographic camera that passively generates true reproductions of the phenomena it captures (UM II.6, 91). In connection with this, the task of the historian should be merely encyclopedic: his purpose is to collect all these veridical reproductions of reality in a kind of photographic album or registry of history, where they can be displayed and examined at leisure (UM II.4, 78-79). It is not difficult to see why Nietzsche thinks these are symptoms of a weak personality, for they represent purely passive attitudes with respect to the past. Nietzsche insists that the importance of history cannot reside in merely accumulating curious trinkets of knowledge that serve to generate idle “critical” musings (UM II.5, 87). Instead, the value of history lies in extracting meaningful symbols from past events that “[disclose] in the original theme a whole world of profundity, power and beauty” (UM II.6, 93). For Nietzsche, the historian should appropriate the past in order to produce effects that will affirmatively transform the present into a great future. But historians today have no desire to engage in this kind of digestive and procreative exercise. As Nietzsche observes, “knowledge, consumed without a hunger for it and even counter to one’s needs, now no longer acts as an agent for transforming the outside world but remains concealed within a chaotic inner world” (UM II.4, 78). Notice that the inner world is described as chaotic (i.e. fragmentary)
precisely because knowledge is not being used in the service of transformative action in the world. This gives us an important clue about the character of wholeness as an ideal of unity, and I will return to it later.

The other problematic aspect of contemporary history that I want to highlight is Nietzsche’s criticism of its total submission to Hegelian models of interpreting the past. On such models, history is a narrative of the progressive unfolding of reason and freedom, a story concerning the emergence with logical necessity of the highest form of civilization, our own, out of primitive chaos and barbarism (UM II.8, 104-105). For Nietzsche, this is inimical to creative action because it foments a slavish acceptance of how things are; an utterly passive attitude that is only aggravated by the unbridled pride with which we elevate ourselves to the godlike status of perfected beings in which the ultimate goal of world-history is fulfilled (Ibid). This sort of arrogance is comical, and Nietzsche thinks that behind it lies an ironic self-awareness that eventually leads to a cynicism that is destructive of life. The irony is that deep down the modern historian knows that there is nothing to rejoice about in this alleged self-completion of history, and he harbors the presentiment that our hopes and energies will not survive into the future (UM II.9, 107). According to Nietzsche, many find refuge from this fearful awareness by embracing a type of cynicism that he finds epitomized in a slogan he takes from Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious: “the total surrender of the personality to the world-process”. The cynicism inherent in this slogan, as Nietzsche understand it, consist in the belief that the individual is nothing but a cog in the machine of the world-process that will be served no matter what the person does or fails to do (UM II.9, 110). For Hartmann there is a promise of redemption that comes with the realization of the utter powerlessness of the individual: the redemption from the suffering and the absurdity of existence by the painless extinction of the personality (something that, later in life (see GM III), Nietzsche will call the cultural nihilism of the will to nothingness).

Ultimately, for Nietzsche, modern history can only help produce “systems of individualist egoism, brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of the non-brothers, and similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity” (UM II.9, 112-113). It may seem somewhat odd that the kind of practical egoism that Nietzsche is denouncing here should partly result from a historical practice that, as we have seen, supposedly promulgates a passive mentality, a renunciation of the personality (and in particular of freedom), since such egoism would appear to involve, on the contrary, an exacerbation of individual willing, even if merely egoistic willing. But this paradox is only apparently so. For Nietzsche, this petty practical egoism actually shares with the weakness of personality characteristic of modern history a general incapacity to stimulate the spirit into creative activity. To see this, reflect on the way in which modern life has come to be dominated by the utilitarian preoccupation with wellbeing and pleasure. If we labor, it is to procure the monetary security that allows us to comfortably afford those things we take to be the ultimate goals of life, namely, shelter, food, recreation, and the like. From a Nietzschean perspective, this means that we are preoccupied with a life that has been degraded to its most vulgar level. The person who settles for this kind of existence loses himself in the pursuit of goals that are meant to satiate his animal nature, that is, the part of him that is least suited to truly manifest his own creative willing. In that sense, the goal of the practical egoism Nietzsche decries here is the same nihilistic goal that operates in modern history: that of evading active and independent willing (that of evading freedom) by preventing the person from becoming a unity, i.e. from becoming an individual whose interior self truly and coherently manifests itself in outer, creative action.

The preceding discussion suggests that the failure of correspondence we are after is a kind of evasion of responsibility. Each of us has been endowed with an interior creative energy that is uniquely our own. In the Third Meditation Nietzsche calls this the “genius”: a spiritual nature that should be expressed authentically in outward action. Unifying oneself, becoming
whole, is a matter of being true to one’s inner drive (to one’s genius) and fashioning for it a form that will genuinely correspond to it, thereby manifesting one’s unique personality or content. Failing to do this means failing to execute a task that has been entrusted to each of us alone. Since the task is always within our reach, the individual that persists in remaining a fragmented entity in which outer form fails to correspond to an inner content, is guilty of this failure and can thus be described as living a life that is in constant flight from responsibility and maturity; a life that is, in Nietzschen terms, contrary to all new planting, bold experimentation, and free aspiration (UM III.5, 158-159). Only the strong personality is capable of the self-discipline required to face up to the challenge of becoming free by funneling his internal energies (what Nietzsche later in life will call his will to power and also his drive or instinct for freedom) into an effective outer activity that is genuinely revelatory of who or what he is. But what is this activity? Thus far my analysis has been mostly negative: I have tried to draw near to the ideal of wholeness by way of Nietzsche’s description of what it is not like. In order to fully understand what is involved in wholeness we need to investigate how the proper unity between content and form is achieved in the first place. To flesh this out, let us turn to the last two meditations.

3. The distinction between true and apparent needs (or requirements)

As gateway to this issue, let me pick up a thread from the Second Meditation I have not yet discussed. In that work, Nietzsche equates the fragmented nature of the weak personality with insensibility: a condition of emotional atrophy in which existence and the real produce only a slight impression in the person (UM II.4, 79). This emotional incapacity makes the weak person incapable of trusting his own feelings and leads him to eventually surrender his personality to other forces, like those of the state, or religion, or some ideology or other; he is thus led to the nihilistic condition mentioned earlier. In this condition, the person learns how to be affected by things in accordance with whatever those forces dictate should be our proper attitudes and reactions. Far from expressing his authentic personality outwardly, this person becomes a role-player in which no genuine inwardness is revealed, but always only an empty shell manufactured by some part of himself that was beguiled to pledge allegiance to one of these external forces. The outward movement of such a person, his visible acting, is then, as Nietzsche puts it, “not the act and self-revelation of the totality of the interior but only a feeble or crude attempt on the part of one or other of these threads to pose as being the whole” (UM II.4, 81). For Nietzsche, this phenomenon is especially prevalent among the Germans. Their sensibility has been ruined by history and philosophy, disciplines that have spun a confusing web of concepts and abstractions that, instead of helping a person mediate his relation to reality, contribute to his complete disorientation. The German case, however, is for Nietzsche only the most visible and distressing instance of a condition that afflicts all modern cultures. In order to truly oppose this state of numbness and to restore these cultures to wholeness, Nietzsche thinks that we need to reawaken in ourselves the capacity for genuine feeling. Nietzsche calls attention to this problem partly because he thinks that only creatures capable of genuine feeling can experience the kind of wonder at the riddle of life that is required to answer the challenge of justifying our existence. It is very telling that the last three meditations all seem to revolve around the problem of human existence. As an example take the following representative passage:

The fact of our existing at all in this here-and-now must be the strongest incentive to us to live according to our own laws and standards: the inexplicable fact that we live precisely today, when we had all infinite time in which to come into existence, that we possess only a shortlived today in which to demonstrate why and to what end we came into existence now and at no other time. We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently we want to be the true helmsman of this existence and
refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance (UM III.1, 128; emphasis added).

Recall that earlier I had said that for Nietzsche the notion of wholeness is linked to the theme of redemption. Here is the point of intersection of those ideas. Modern man’s incapacity to feel properly prevents him from being summoned to the fundamental problem of existence: he either fails to see the need for an answer here, or he mistakenly thinks that the answer is rather obvious, that human existence becomes warranted by a political event such as the foundation of the Reich, or by winning fame, honor, and prizes, or by the accumulation of wealth, or by maximizing pleasure, or the like. For Nietzsche these are all unsatisfactory answers that cater to the more vulgar, animalistic, and slavish side of the human being, that is, the side that is really least suited to give meaning and justification to life. In Nietzsche’s account the ideal of wholeness provides the adequate answer, redeeming the individual from the suffering caused by the weight of existence. How does it do that? The answer lies in the way in which this ideal responds to what Nietzsche calls the real needs or requirements of the individual, instead of catering to his pseudo or apparent needs, as other alternatives do. In what does this distinction between real and pseudo needs consist?

I think that we are now in a position to understand what pseudo needs look like: they are the sorts of things that we normally tend to confuse with our real needs, namely, things like wealth, physical health, pleasure, professional success, public respect, and so on. To be sure, Nietzsche is not suggesting that these things are of no consequence to human life or that they should not be pursued. The point, I take it, is that these things must not be pursued as ends in themselves or confused with the real needs of the individual. Since the latter do not belong to this list, they must be the things that allow a person to effectively channel his genius (his content) into the kind of outward action that is revelatory of who he really is. In other words, they are the sorts of things that would allow the person to become the true helmsman of his own life, to exercise his drive for freedom in an authentic fashion and not slavishly, as he is otherwise bound to do, because of the external pressures that surround him. Thus, in Nietzsche’s view, our true needs are the things that help us achieve the unity of content and form (i.e., wholeness) we have been searching after. For instance, part of the burden of the Second Meditation is to show that, since an unbridled excess of history has made us into emasculated slaves, what we truly need is an effective medicine to counter this excess, and thereby liberate us: we need a dose of the powers Nietzsche calls unhistorical and suprahistorical (UM II.10, 120). Similarly, if a future post-modern culture should find itself afflicted by an excess of the unhistorical element, and, thus, find itself enslaved to its contempt for knowledge and science, then their true needs would be different from ours, and the historical power that is a danger to our freedom would be the proper medicine for them. True needs are the things necessary for free and authentic expression of one’s inwardness. This is why in a telling passage Nietzsche claims that the “free personality” (“freie Persönlichkeit”) is one that is truthful toward himself and toward others, for only this kind of truthfulness can shed light on the misery and distress of life, and allow art and religion, the genuine ancillaries of culture and the individual, to “combine to implant a culture which corresponds to real needs and does not, as present-day universal education teaches it to do, deceive itself as to these needs and thereby become a walking lie” (UM II.5, 84-5; emphasis added).

4. Becoming a piece of fate (becoming necessary)

But, if part of the thrust behind the admonition to not allow one’s life to resemble a mere act of chance, is that one must be truthful to oneself in a way that allows one to recognize what is genuinely required to regain control of one’s own existence, to become what Nietzsche himself calls a free personality, the other side of this admonition...
is that being responsive to one’s true needs is a matter of learning how to become necessary by pursuing a goal that can serve to wrestle one’s life out of the accidental, purposeless state it naturally finds itself in by default. One place where we can find this latter idea expressed most clearly is in the Fourth Meditation. Nietzsche there, once again, sounds the theme of the deep chasm between our feelings and the concepts with which we mediate our relation to the world, this time within the context of discussing the puzzling appearance of great music in the life of modern man. Nietzsche finds this appearance strange because, as his analysis in all of the Meditations purports to show, our modern age is weak and inauthentic. How could such an age have produced the wonderful series of great composers that came to the scene in the 18th and 19th centuries? Nietzsche’s answer to this riddle is that the appearance of these artists—among whom Wagner is supposed to be the latest link in the chain, at least for the young Nietzsche—is a manifestation of the pressing need (the necessity) to find a way to make true feeling audible again to the world. This music is a response to the type of need that was discussed earlier, namely, the real need to heal language, which is in a state of distress and sickness that keeps us estranged from genuine feeling, and thereby contributes to our fragmentation and disunity. For Nietzsche, the existence of these great artists shows “that true music is a piece of fate and primal law; for it is impossible to derive its appearance at precisely this time from an empty, meaningless act of chance” (UM IV.6, 221; emphasis added). Notice that the notion of being a piece of fate, or of being necessary, is here contrasted with the concept of chance or arbitrariness that, as we saw, was at the heart of the admonition to become who we are, i.e., to become truly free and independent, or to become whole. The admonition consists precisely in the thought that we ought to resist the impulse to let ourselves be ruled by chance, and, instead, be the genuine helmsmen of our existence. By showing itself as a force that takes up this struggle and responds to the calling to evict chance from life, music reveals itself as a manifestation of freedom and independence on the part of the composers who created it, i.e., a manifestation of freedom in the world.

Thus, in Nietzsche’s view, being necessary is not the opposite of being free, nor is it equivalent to being causally determined through and through, as some commentators seem to believe, but is, on the contrary, the genuine expression of individual freedom. The person who comes to understand his true needs and strives to meet them, thereby opposes the blind contingency that operates in nature, taking charge of his own existence and revealing his own unique inwardness by becoming whole, that is, by becoming a genuine unity of content and form. Indeed, in this person, outer form stops being what Nietzsche disparagingly calls a mere display of pleasing appearances, and becomes “the true concept of form as shape necessitated by content, which has nothing to do with ‘pleasing’ or ‘displeasing’ precisely because it is necessary and not arbitrary” (UM IV.5, 216; emphasis added).

What I take this last quote to suggest is that the unity of content and form that signals a person’s wholeness is achieved by a process whereby the content comes to necessarily govern or guide the way in which the form is shaped. Unfortunately, I cannot really spell out the full implications of this idea in the space of this essay. But part of what I take Nietzsche to be saying here is that the unity of the person is established when his drive to freedom or independence becomes, through proper self-discipline, truly expressed in his actions (his outer appearance or form) in a way that is consequent with that drive, that is, in a way that follows from the agent’s recognition of rational requirements or, in the language Nietzsche is using here and that I have been emphasizing, true needs that must be met if he is to genuinely exercise and give outward expression to his freedom (his innermost drive). It is in that sense, I think, that the activity of the person, or his outer form, could be said to rationally or necessarily follow form his free agency (his unique content) in a manner that signals the achievement of wholeness (the true unity of content and form). The activity follows necessarily from the person’s content in the sense that it is a response to a normative ideal that the person realizes he cannot fail to pursue.
if he is ever to become whole as he wishes. As we will see shortly, this ideal is the goal of promoting the genius in himself and in all, or the goal of furthering the cause of human freedom. Of course, the important point to emphasize here is that a person can fail to pursue this goal and, thus, fail to become whole; he can let the world and others be in control of his own existence and, instead of paying heed to the admonition I quoted earlier, allow his life to become a mindless act of chance, to become the contrary of a necessary life (UM III.1, 128).

5. On the act of wholeness and why psychic unity is not the aim

Precisely because one can fail to become necessary and whole, Nietzsche thinks that cultural reformation is the fundamental task of our age. Modern man suffers from false needs and is in constant flight from himself (UM III.5, 158). He represents the form of a person who has evaded his genius and has become wholly exterior; he is a bag of clothes without kernel (UM III.1, 128). Since the problem lies in the fact that he is unknown to himself, the solution is to set him on the road to self-knowledge, so that he can learn his true needs and come to understand that he must not betray his unique inwardness. For Nietzsche, this means that we require a pedagogical overhaul aimed at combating the forces of inauthentic culture that conspire against the reawakening of our sensibility. This pedagogical reform begins by enlisting the influence of true educators: the genuine philosophers, artists, and saints, who, having become whole, command our affection and inspire us to become whole ourselves.26 In the *Meditations* Nietzsche uses the concept of “genius” as placeholder for these three types of human beings, who thus function as models of the proper relation of content and form; i.e. as models of wholeness.27 The aim of genuine culture, then, is to promote wholeness by providing us, the living individuals, with models of geniuses (both living and dead) that can inspire us to become whole ourselves, whereupon we too can function as models of wholeness for others. Nietzsche now goes on to suggest that the way culture does this is through love. It is our love for these geniuses that allows us to heed the calling of our own genius (stirring within us), and to engage in the process of self-overcoming that will eventually make us whole.

In the *Meditations*, the ancient Greeks (above all, the Pre-Platonic philosophers and tragedians), Schopenhauer, and Wagner, among others, function as models of true educators in this sense. For Nietzsche, the principal thing these individuals have to teach us is not their particular doctrines or belief systems, but whether or not they were or are the incarnation of truly autonomous and independent beings themselves. In particular, the most important lesson they can impart is that the genius in us should not fear entering into conflict with his age. Indeed, for Nietzsche, becoming independent means, in a certain sense, becoming a criminal of sorts: the person who seeks to emancipate himself must appear as a law-breaker. He is attempting to bring something new into the world and that means destroying or displacing what was there before. The old must perish to make way for the new. But this is an affront to the traditional order of things, and according to Nietzsche, whoever perpetrates this act of independence incurs a guilt that he can only expiate by pursuing greatness, otherwise his freedom is a piece of impudence and a presumption (see UM II.1, 64 and II.3, 75; UM III.4, 153 and III.8, 183).

But how does our love for these models educate us? According to Nietzsche, the chief way it does so is by alienating us from the inauthentic selves that we normally inhabit by default, due in large measure to the pressures exerted on us by the external forces that surround us (UM III.6, 163; UM IV.7, 222). This self-alienation is a form of hatred of oneself. Being awakened from our inauthentic slumber by our love for our educators makes us feel contempt for the person that we uncritically took ourselves to genuinely be. This awakening Nietzsche calls the first consecration to culture. Its distinctive feature is to instill in the person a feeling of shame without distress (born, again, out of love for his educators), a feeling of contempt for his narrowness of spirit and for the

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things that keep his uniqueness imprisoned; and through this feeling, a “longing to become whole” (UM III.6, 162-3). Our love serves, in this way, to point us in the direction of genuine culture and its fundamental aim, which Nietzsche in these works variously describes as the perfection of nature and the procreation of the genius, and which I have been arguing we can also call the ideal of autonomy or of the free personality (UM III.3, 142 and III.5, 160).

The first consecration leads to a second one, which Nietzsche describes in the following terms:29

The individual has to employ his own wrestling and longing as the alphabet by means of which he can now read off the aspirations of mankind as a whole. But he may not halt even here; from this stage he has to climb up to a yet higher one; culture demands of him, not only an inward experience, not only an assessment of the outward world that streams all around him, but finally and above all an act, that is to say a struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the production of the genius (UM III.6, 163; emphasis added).

The goal, then, that will make the individual whole is a cultural struggle on behalf of the genius. It is crucial not to misunderstand this as a sacrifice of the individual person for the betterment of a few great individuals, or as the command that he devote all his efforts to the production of greatness in others.30 The production of the genius that is the goal of the ideal of wholeness is always first and foremost the realization of that genius in each and every one of us.31 Nietzsche makes this clear throughout many passages in the Third Meditation. As an example, take the passage where Nietzsche claims that the fundamental idea of culture “sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature” (UM III.5, 160; the stress within the italicized phrase is mine).32

Here we should recall the existential undercurrent that flows throughout all the Meditations. For Nietzsche, each human being is thrown into existence with the capacity to be free, and yet, at the same time, with the realization that this event is a fluke and an inexplicable occurrence in the sense that, from the standpoint of his reflective awareness of himself, his presence in the world, and, more importantly, his continued presence in it, is ungrounded and unjustified. Why continue acting? Why go through the motions of living and existing at all? The answer that we are simply endowed with a default desire to stave off death (a will to live) is not enough, for we clearly see it as providing merely a contingent ground on which to found our resolve to continue existing. For Nietzsche, to simply rely on this contingent ground would be to make our life meaningless and ultimately valueless: the arbitrary plaything of nature and the world of becoming. If our life is going to have meaning for us, then we must provide that meaning in the form of an aim that is not contingently authoritative but necessarily so. I have been arguing that for Nietzsche the requisite aim is the pursuit of genius (or freedom) in oneself and in all. The person who guides his actions by such an aim places himself in the circle of genuine culture, in which he works together with other like-minded individuals in the formation of genuine cultural institutions that will protect them from the forces that threaten to misappropriate each person’s drive to freedom. As Nietzsche puts it,

These individuals have to complete their work—that is the sense of their staying together; and all who participate in the institution have, through continual purification and mutual support, to help to prepare within themselves and around them for the birth of the genius and the ripening of his work (UM III.6, 176; emphasis added).

And the birth of such a genius in one’s own self (or in others), will coincide, then, with the appearance of wholeness in oneself (or in others), with the manifestation of a genuine, as opposed to a false, borrowed, fragmented, or weak personality.
But how exactly does a person fight for culture in this way? How does he prepare for the birth of the genius in himself and in others? Nietzsche’s answer is that he does so by unifying the dividing forces of society that keep genuine culture fragmented and that keep us estranged from each other and from the ideal of a free humanity that is the essence of our species. To illustrate the point, take Nietzsche’s example of Wagner. According to Nietzsche, Wagner’s greatness consisted in his struggle on behalf of culture to unite and reconcile music (the medium of expression of genuine feeling) with language, thereby healing the current rift between these elements (recall the discussion in section 3). The seal of wholeness, then, is an act that responds to our genuine needs by attempting to master the chaotic wilderness of forces that is our world; an act that brings together into unity things that, in Nietzsche’s words, were “formerly thought to be set irreconcilably asunder” (UM IV.5, 214). And, again, this act is motivated and guided by an ideal: the ideal of freedom or autonomy (of the genius), that the agent recognizes as authoritative for him and for everyone, and to which he struggles to live up to, by seeing himself as a member of a community that fights for the realization of this ideal in the world, that is, a community that fights for genuine culture, and, in so fighting, fashions that culture both concretely, in the actual world, and ideally, in our shared image of what that world should or could be (an image that is being constantly invented and reinvented in our collective imagination and shared aspirations).

This is why the realization of wholeness in a person is not primarily an event of psychic integration. It does not consist, as most commentators have suggested, in an act of uniting the various parts of the soul, or in harmonizing the different elements that form part of the agent’s overall mental economy. To be sure, that kind of harmony certainly can be a by-product of wholeness, as Nietzsche understands it; but it need not be. A truly genuine personality that authentically manifests independence in his actions (one in which content and form are expressed as a single living unity) can be a profoundly conflicted person, someone who struggles with his desires and emotions, and who has to suffer through a tense and tumultuous internal life. Conversely, a person whose mental economy is perfectly integrated, and who manages to make all his drives, affects, and thoughts cohere and be harmoniously organized in the pursuit of a single aim, could be a mere slave to an external authority that governs every aspect of his life (a perfect Christian that has bequeathed his soul and his freedom to the service of God). Despite all his coherence and internal harmony, such a person would remain, in Nietzsche’s view, a fragmented personality that is, even if he himself fails to notice it, the plaything of other forces. His fragmentation manifests itself not in his mental economy, but in the dissonance between what he truly is and could be, namely, a free and autonomous human being (a genius), and what he shows himself to be through his actions and his outward appearance: a mere slave to an external and contingent authority that dictates what he should and should not do. Even if such a person exercises minimal control of his actions (even if he is more than an automata, or an animal controlled by his instincts), he is nonetheless not the real author of his actions because he is exercising his autonomous self-control slavishly, by forgetting to keep the ideal of autonomy (of the genius) as the guiding principle of his activities. He is, thus, adopting aims that actually stand in the way or end up undermining that very ideal.

When one realizes that for Nietzsche wholeness is not a matter of becoming a self in the first place, or of making one’s psyche cohere harmoniously, one can see that the problem of whether unity is merely a necessary or instead a sufficient condition for freedom is misplaced. For wholeness and freedom are one and the same. Wholeness coincides with freedom because it simply is the manifestation of the fact that a person is independent and the true helmsman of his own life: it is an instantiation of the person’s autonomy that results from and is guided by his own view of himself as free, and his aspiration to live up to that very image that he has of himself. Someone who lives up to this ideal might be, nonetheless, torn by conflicting forces that battle inside of him and give him no respite. Although such a person is internally disharmonious, he is
still whole insofar as there is no disconnection between his autonomy and his activities, that is, insofar as he has managed, despite the internal turmoil, to forge a living unity of content and form.

Of course, in saying all this, I do not mean to deny that some minimum of psychic integration is required for a person to become whole. If one is simply a totally anarchic and chaotic jumble of drives, emotions, and thoughts, then one will not function very well as an agent in the world, much less be capable of engaging in the sort of project that Nietzsche claims makes one whole. But this is not something that ordinarily a person has to pursue as a deliberate aim. And the reason such integration is a requisite condition for wholeness, is that it is a requisite condition for agency of any type. Even an animal, which in Nietzsche’s account is an agent that lacks autonomy, must possess a minimum of mental integration to function properly and carry on with its characteristic activities in the world.

If wholeness were a matter of psychic integration in an agent, it would be difficult to see why Nietzsche thinks that it could possess redemptive significance for a person. Why would being unified in one’s mental economy mean that one’s existence is justified or has all of a sudden become meaningful? This aspect of the Nietzschean ideal of wholeness (which, as was argued, is central to it) does not seem to me to fit well with the notion that it consists in agential unity of the sort defended by most commentators. But this aspect of the ideal does fit rather nicely with the characterization of wholeness that I have offered in this essay. I have claimed that for Nietzsche the individual becomes whole by taking up the struggle for wholeness in the world, that is, by pursuing actions that seek to promote autonomy and independence, for himself and for all. Nietzsche believes that this fight on behalf of genuine culture and its aim provides the individual the redemption he seeks from the meaninglessness of existence. After all, his struggle places him within a community of greatness that transcends his own immediate existence and the narrow cultural milieu in which he lives. Following Schopenhauer, Nietzsche dubs this community the republic of genius (UM II.9, 111). As part of this ecumenical society (one that is, again, both ideal and concrete but not narrowly circumscribed to a particular nation), the person becomes necessary for all that is and that is yet to come; he manages to stop being the plaything of time and becoming, and thereby achieves a kind of imperishability or eternity: he becomes part of the single line of ascending humanity in which the great fighters of culture live contemporaneously with each other, in an eternal spiritual dialogue of freedom, greatness, and creativity that is being continually renewed and guaranteed for all. These people are united not so much by their great accomplishments, as by their commitment to genuine culture and their mutual struggle on its behalf; they are united, thus, by their commitment to freedom and the ideal of a higher and nobler humanity that, for Nietzsche, is promised and contained in it.39

6. Conclusion: wholeness beyond the early works

By way of conclusion I now want to turn to the question of whether my interpretation of wholeness has any relevance beyond Nietzsche’s early work. One potential problem for it is that Nietzsche allegedly changed his mind in important respects later in life, renouncing his early romantic and idealistic phase. In particular, a prevalent view, defended by commentators like Maudemarie Clark, is that Nietzsche’s position on truth and other important metaphysical and epistemological issues underwent radical revisions starting with the texts of the middle period.40 My account is blind to those important changes and relies heavily on concepts and figures that, it is said, Nietzsche later disowned, like the belief that Schopenhauer and Wagner were incarnations of greatness, or the belief in the notion that art and artistic creativity can justify one’s existence, or, for that matter, in the will as free, and so on. Even if my account of wholeness is correct about the early Nietzsche, it probably will not be applicable to whatever ideal of wholeness he retained in his later life, which presumably incorporated his more naturalistic views on moral psychology and
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his late, and scientifically inspired, insights into metaphysics and epistemology.

Since this worry rests on a particular view of Nietzsche’s overall philosophical trajectory that has become somewhat standard (and which I do not fully share), to dispel it completely, I would have to take issue with that picture and show either that Nietzsche did not really alter his views on the relevant concepts as radically as it is alleged, or that, even if he did, the particular metaphysical and epistemological doctrines that he revised do not affect the overall view of wholeness that I have discussed. Obviously, I cannot pursue either of these strategies here. However, I think that I can go a long way toward dispelling this worry by showing that most of the passages in the late Nietzsche’s published works that ostensibly deal with some kind of ideal of wholeness, yet in a way that often seems intractable and bizarre, can be understood better in the light of my analysis of this ideal. This includes the famous Goethe passage from *Twilight of the Idols* that is universally cited by those writing on this theme and that is taken to be one of Nietzsche’s most definitive late statements on the subject of wholeness. Here is the passage in its entirety:

Goethe –not a German event, but a European one: a magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by a return to nature, by an *ascend* to the naturalness of the Renaissance– a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that century. He bore its strongest instincts within himself: the sensibility, the idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary (–the latter being merely a form of the unreal). He sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all, from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, over himself, into himself. What he wanted was *totality*; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, will (–preached with the most abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself. In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said Yes to everything that was related to him in this respect –and he had no greater experience than that *ens realissimum* [most real being] called Napoleon. Goethe conceived a human being who would be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself, and who might dare to afford the whole range and wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to use to his advantage even that from which the average nature would perish; the man for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden, unless it be weakness, whether called vice or virtue. Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the *faith* that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole –he does not negate anymore. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name *Dionysus* (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 49).

I trust that the reader who has followed me up to this point will find that this passage resonates quite strongly with the themes that I have been sounding throughout my analysis. First of all, notice that Goethe is said to have been a European event and not a German one. Part of what makes him great is that he was not concerned with the petty narrow interests of a nation, but rather had his eye on more global endeavors and, as such, was part of an ecumenical society and culture.41 Second, a distinctive feature of Goethe’s striving is that he struggled to unite the aspects of his century that seemed to be set irreconcilably asunder: the oppositions between reason and the senses, between feeling and will, and so on. This too, as we saw, was an important aspect of Wagner’s wholeness in the *Fourth Meditation*; he also fought the dividing forces of society that kept culture fragmented. Notice, also, that Goethe’s wholeness is a matter of self-discipline and self-control as it was for the Nietzsche of the *Meditations*. But, finally, in this passage we are told that Goethe stands amid the cosmos with...
a joyous and trustful fatalism that consists in believing that the particular is loathsome and that all is redeemed in the whole.

In his essay on this subject, Mathias Risse takes this last claim to signal Goethe’s literal acceptance of a fatalistic view of himself. Under this interpretation, Goethe thinks of himself as someone who belongs to a chain of causal determinants that relieve him from notions of responsibility or guilt (Risse 2007, 78-9). In my interpretation, by contrast, Goethe’s trusting fatalism consists in the fact that he understands himself to be a piece of fate or destiny, in the same sense in which Nietzsche claimed in the Fourth Meditation that true music is a piece of fate and primal law (UM IV.6, 221). Like this music, Goethe refuses to be an accident of nature, a meaningless act of chance. Instead, he has faith in himself, and he trusts that by taking charge of his life and by defeating contingency he has become (or he will become) necessary: one law more for the present and for all that is yet to come. And, presumably, he has done this by placing himself in the higher circle of universal culture and by recognizing the duties that befall anyone who does so, in particular the duty to uphold and fight for the genius (for freedom and autonomy) that is the essence of humanity as a whole. This is why, for him, the individual as such is loathsome; what truly counts and what gives meaning to one’s individual existence is the suprapersonal goal of culture: the procreation of the genius in us and in everyone else; a goal that one could also describe, in good Nietzschean fashion, as the enhancement or ennoblement of the human type.

But my interpretation not only makes better sense of this important passage. I believe that it also sheds some, perhaps unexpected, light on other puzzling passages in Twilight that tend to be used—in my view unwarrantedly—in support of a particular “naturalist” picture and interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Take, for instance, Nietzsche’s claim that “one is necessary, one is a piece of destiny, one belongs to the whole, one is the whole” (TI, The Four Great Errors 8); or his insistence that “the single human being is a piece of fatum [destiny] from the front and from the rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be” (TI, Morality as Anti-Nature 6); or his certainly bizarre claim that “the single one, the ‘individual’, as hitherto understood by the people and the philosopher alike, is an error after all: he is nothing by himself, no atom, no ‘link in the chain’, nothing merely inherited from former times—he is the whole single line of humanity up to himself” (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 33). Contrary to what some commentators suggest, these statements are not expressions of Nietzsche’s belief in causal determinism. They belong rather to the cluster of ideas that he deploys in the service of his practical philosophy and, in particular, of his ideal of individual wholeness. I believe that in these and similar statements in his late philosophy, Nietzsche is hammering his conviction (stretching all the way back to his youth) that the individual human being is unique and indispensable for genuine culture, and, thereby, for the future of humanity as a whole. He should not be viewed as a monad nor as the product of the chain of causal determinism that stretches back all the way past his birth. Instead, for Nietzsche, each individual human being is all of humanity in the sense that he represents either its ascending or its descending line. If he does the latter, then he is lost to himself and to all of us. He becomes an inauthentic person that is the plaything of time and the endless stream of becoming. But if, on the contrary, he represents the ascending line of humanity, then he is a great human being, a piece of destiny, and a spirit that governs the world, by being the type of person who takes on the goal of promoting freedom in himself and in all, and who has thereby become part of a suprapersonal community of greatness that redeems him from the suffering and the absurdity of his individual existence. Nietzsche’s hope for all of us is that we will be fortunate enough to find true educators that can liberate our spirit, and set us on the path of that supreme autognosis by means of which we can discipline ourselves and join the circle of ascending life he calls genuine culture.
1. See, for example: TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 41 and 49; BGE 212; Z II.20 and Z III.12; HAH I 95; and, most importantly, and in a more focused and sustained manner, the last three Untimely Meditations that will be the subject of my analysis.

2. See, for example, Nehamas 1985; Schacht 1992; Guay 2002; Leiter 2002; Reginster 2003; Richardson 2005; Risse 2007; Gemes 2009; Poellner 2009; May 2009; Katsafanas 2011. Not all of these commentators discuss the ideal of wholeness directly as a topic on its own right. Most actually do so only in the context of discussing Nietzsche’s views on moral psychology more generally, and, in particular, his views on agency and free will. One notable exception in this regard is the study by Lucy Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung: the Whole Self in the Union of Opposites, which centers on the concept of wholeness itself; see Huskinson 2004. Her book belongs to a tradition of commentators that have sought to explore the relation between Nietzsche’s thought and psychoanalysis; people such as Paul Bishop 1995, Graham Parkes 1994, and, especially, Patricia Dixon 1999, whose work Huskinson engages with the most, in a relation of both opponent and ally, characterizing her own arguments as more thorough explorations of the sort of aim pursued by Dixon: the aim of demonstrating that the quest for wholeness, which is the central theme in Jung’s work, is also the principal thread that runs through the entire fabric of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Because of its roots in psychoanalysis, this tradition has also fallen quite naturally into the common, and, in my view, pernicious tendency to interpret the ideal of wholeness as an ideal of psychic unity or integration.

3. Here I think that we can distinguish mainly two camps: the oldest and more prevalent one interprets unity or wholeness as tightly connected to free agency (e. g. Nehamas 1985); the other, upcoming and, perhaps at this stage, still less common camp, actually denies this connection (e. g. Risse 2007).

4. Although I will not dwell on Birth, I consider the analysis I will defend here to be continuous with Nietzsche’s general position in that book. This may seem controversial, since, as will become clear later, in this essay I will be defending a notion of wholeness that may appear not to sit well with Nietzsche’s polemics in Birth against Socratism. Although I cannot defend my position here, I believe Nietzsche’s anti-Socratic condemnation to be much more nuanced than is commonly acknowledged. In my view, the early Nietzsche was not the anti-rationalist he is usually portrayed as being. In Birth, Nietzsche’s criticisms focus on the excessive overestimation of reason and, in particular, on the overly optimistic idea that Socratic-Apollinian reason can, by itself and without recourse to Dionysian insight, once and for all correct existence by riding it of suffering (BT 13-15). This polemic, however, in no way signals Nietzsche’s rejection of reason’s practical functions or a general and principled disdain for knowledge and science. On the contrary, even Nietzsche’s conception of tragedy is fundamentally that of a marriage between the Dionysian and the Apollinian (a unifying effort that, as will become evident in what follows, is quite in line with his pronouncements on wholeness in the Meditations). The Dionysian experience of unity with nature that, Nietzsche claims, is produced through music, and that spreads as an epidemic in the spectators of tragedy, requires the Apollinian complement to achieve its tragic effect: which is not simply to strip the members of the audience from their cultural identities and their conscious individualities, but, beyond that, to help them regain their individuality and cultural identity in a higher and nobler sense, thereby allowing them to consciously affirm their finite individual existence. While this life-affirmation is experienced at the individual level, it is enabled through a suprapersonal vantage point and is, therefore, not a narrowly egoistic affair. Through tragedy the Greeks learned to identify themselves with the essential greatness of their Apollinian culture, erected in defiance of nature and doomed, like all else, to be dissolved back into the same nature it sought to combat, only to be resurrected again from the womb of that very nature into a higher circle of culture and individuation. Thus, for Nietzsche, in the end what the Greeks identified with was the perpetual, universal striving of humanity (the conscious surrogates of the natural, Dionysian Will) toward higher and higher forms of their own individuation (Apollinian forms). Again, these are no doubt controversial claims that I cannot substantiate here. My aim is simply to anticipate the likely objection that my account of wholeness is incompatible with Nietzsche’s arguments in
Birth, and to suggest that the incompatibility can be solved if we are willing to entertain the possibility that we might have been wrong about the exact nature of Nietzsche’s anti-rationalism in this early work.

5. This complicates Nietzsche’s argument and raises some difficulties for it since in the Meditations he appears to unthinkingly slide from talk of culture as a living unity to talk of individual people as such, and thus problematically treats as interchangeable entities that seem distinct. The whole matter is complicated even further when we realize that by “genuine culture” Nietzsche does not mean some set of beliefs and behaviors that are characteristic of a group sharing a particular history, land, or tradition, but rather has in mind a collective entity that exists across nations and customs. Thus, for Nietzsche, even if Germans had a genuine culture to speak of, what would make it so would seem to have nothing to do with what was particularly German about it. Instead, it would be determined by whether the Germans (or perhaps at least the most influential people among them) were entirely “genuine individuals” of the sort that collectively conform an ecumenical culture that transcends their particular age, nation, and history. Granting that Nietzsche’s usage of these terms seems somewhat problematic, I will not attempt to justify it here. Instead, I will follow Nietzsche in his usage wherever it may lead. As was mentioned, he is already deploying the notion of culture in a very idiosyncratic way, giving it a strange definition. It is partly because of this peculiar usage that he is able to slide so easily from talk of culture to talk of the particular individuals that conform it. As a genuine living unity of content and form, an authentic culture just is a collection of people who have become such authentic living unities, that is, people who have overcome their fragmentation and their weakness of personality.

6. In connection with what I am about to say regarding the metaphor of truth as a woman, the reader should recall that the full title of the book is Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. As I claim below, the main thrust of the metaphor concerns procreation and pregnancy. In particular, it concerns the connection of these concepts to issues of creative willing and action of the sort that is distinctly human. Unlike other animals, we are creatures for whom the future looks volitionally open, appearing as an arena into which we can intentionally project our will and our actions. To lose sight of this, is to lose sight of a central aspect of our humanity. Yet, a substantial part of the polemic Nietzsche sustains in the Meditations has to do with the fact that we have lost sight of the very freedom that makes us distinct from the rest of nature. We have descended again to the level of animality and seem content with being mere creatures of the moment (see UM III.5, 156-159). And, for Nietzsche, what is true of us in general, is especially true of scholars and philosophers in particular. They are creatures without a future, and all their philosophizing is therefore sterile and vain. Their love of truth is a love that completely exhausts itself in the present: it is a love of truth for its own sake. A genuine philosophy of the future, of the sort Beyond Good and Evil announces, signifies a genuine love of truth: one that treats truth as an instrument for the exercise of the kind of freedom and creativity that is distinctly human.

7. Nietzsche’s use of the trope is most prevalent in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a work that because of its literary and poetic nature obviously lends itself more naturally to this kind of metaphorical writing. For different places in that work where I see the metaphor and the symbolism in one way or another being deployed with the significance that I will give it here, see: Z I.18, 20; Z II.5, 10, 14, 15; Z III.3, 15, 16.

8. See, for example, Derrida 1979; Hatab 1981; Booth 1991; Oliver 1993; Babich 1996; Pippin 2001.

9. Think here, for instance, of the section entitled “The Seven Seals” with which the third book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra ends. The leitmotif that is heard at the end of each subdivision throughout the section is the following: “Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted children, unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you, O eternity” (Z III.16).

10. Of course, not all commentators fail to emphasize or call attention to this link to pregnancy and procreation in Nietzsche’s use of the metaphor. But even when they do discuss this element, as does Kelly Oliver 1993, for instance, they fail to see it as the central axis upon which the metaphor turns, and they tend to shift their analysis away from the theme of pregnancy itself and towards the more lewd aspects of the metaphor, and their implications for the metaphysical and epistemological questions that they think Nietzsche is raising by means of them.
To be clear, I am not necessarily arguing that those aspects are not part of the overall import of Nietzsche’s metaphor. I am only suggesting that they are peripheral to the more central theme of procreation and its connection to action and the will (hence, as I shall argue below, to the more important theme of freedom and autonomy, and only derivatively to issues of metaphysics and epistemology, insofar as the latter bear on the former theme).

11. Nietzsche laments later on that same chapter that mankind seems near to discovering that the egoism of individuals, groups or the masses has at all times been the lever of the movements of history; at the same time, however, this discovery has caused no perturbation of any kind, but on the contrary it has now been decreed: egoism shall be our god” (UM II.9, 113).

12. In this connection, it is worth remembering that the Second Meditation begins with a reflection about animal happiness and its relation to the capacity to live unhistorically (see UM II.1, 60-61). Nietzsche claims that this kind of happiness is no longer possible for us because we also have an obverse capacity to live historically (to consciously remember and recycle lived experience). This is why human beings often envy the happiness of the animal. Yet, we should not allow our envy to dictate the course of our lives and make us think, mistakenly, that our happiness resides in approximating this animal condition, or that we can find redemption from the suffering of existence by satiating our own animality. Human beings have become unique and distinct from the rest of nature precisely by their power to set limits to the unhistorical element in which material nature breathes, thereby developing and giving free reign to their spiritual nature. Descending to the animal level again means renouncing our own uniqueness and living a life that is inauthentic. According to Nietzsche, we need to instead find the right balance between the historical and unhistorical aspects of our being. In this connection, consider also Nietzsche’s claim in the Third Meditation that “man is necessary for the redemption of nature from the curse of the life of the animal” (UM III.5, 157).

13. Nietzsche explicitly connects weakness of personality with a lack of self-control and self-discipline; see UM II.4, 80; and UM II.5, 87.

14. In this paragraph, and in this section as a whole, I have used different ways of defining what Nietzsche in these works is calling the “content” of a person. I have referred to it as “a spiritual nature”, “a drive”, “the genius”, “an interior creative energy”, “the instinct for freedom”, and “the will to power”, and in the sections that follow I will somewhat casually add more concepts to this list, like the concept of autonomy, of a free personality, and so on. Although I am aware of loosely trafficking with all these concepts in a manner that may seem problematic, I believe that Nietzsche himself, in his presentation and treatment of these concepts and themes, has given us license to engage in this somewhat (but hopefully not altogether) lax exegetical exercise. Part of the problem is that Nietzsche never really bothers to define these terms, even though they lie at the center of his idea of culture and the ideal of wholeness I am attempting to investigate. The problem is compounded by the fact that Nietzsche clearly takes these terms from the German Idealist and Romantic tradition that precedes him, and in particular, I think, from writers like Schiller, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and even Emerson (who, while influenced by some of these thinkers himself, was writing within a tradition of his own). But the use of notions like “the genius” and “content and form” in these different writers is highly idiosyncratic and, more often than not, equally obscure. The result is that while Nietzsche might have borrowed from these thinkers, he did not do so wholesale, and it is not obvious what he is appropriating and from whom. In my opinion, turning to those writers for help in trying to understand Nietzsche’s position is unlikely to yield the best results, and seems to me to raise exegetical problems of its own. This is not to say that such comparative studies are a waste of time or should not be pursued. But, when it comes to trying to get a handle on Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic use of the concepts of “content” and “form”, I think that we stand to profit more by attempting to extrapolate the meaning of these terms on the basis of intra-textual comparative analysis and of Nietzsche’s larger concerns and his overall arguments in the Meditations. This is what I have attempted to do here, and what I will continue to do in the sections that follow. As a result, however, I will often seem to problematically treat concepts that are not synonymous as if they were. My aim, however, is not to confound but to aid in the understanding of Nietzsche’s very puzzling conceptual usage. Of course, the reader must judge my success on that score. However, as I hope will become clear as my
15. Here is a characteristic passage: “history confuses the feelings and sensibility when these are not strong enough to assess the past by themselves. He who no longer dares to trust himself but involuntarily asks of history ‘How ought I to feel about this?’ finds that his timidity gradually turns him into an actor and that he is playing a role, usually indeed many roles and therefore playing them badly and superficially” (UM II.5, 86).

16. See UM II.4, 80-82.

17. In another telling passage Nietzsche describes our condition as: “Fragmented and in pieces, dissociated almost mechanically into an inner and outer, sown with concepts as with dragon’s teeth, bringing forth conceptual dragons, suffering from the malady of words and mistrusting any feelings of our own which has not yet been stamped with words” (UM II.10, 119). The rift between our feelings and the language we employ to understand them, communicate them, and use them as mediators between us and the world, turns out to be in this way one of the chief obstacles to the realization of the ideal of wholeness in the modern world.

18. For other representative passages in the other two meditations I am focusing on see: UM II.9, 112; and UM IV.7, 222.

19. There are many passages in the Meditations where Nietzsche plays with a contrast between imaginary or apparent needs, Scheinbedürfnisse, and true or real needs, Wahrebedürfnisse. For instance, in the Second Meditation, he writes: “The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real needs [ätlichen Bedürfnisse], and letting their pseudo-needs [Schein-Bedürfnisse] die out” (UM II.10, 122). In the Third Meditation, Nietzsche suggests that “whosoever observes general modern attitudes to art, state, religion, education […] discovers in mankind a certain barbaric capriciousness and intemperance of expression, and the genius is hampered most of all in his development by the prevalence in his time of such strange concepts and fanciful requirements [grillenhafte Bedürfnisse]” (UM III.7, 180). And in the Fourth Meditation, he claims that “from his own experience [Wagner] knew the whole shameful situation in which art and artists find themselves: how a soulless or soul-hardened society, which calls itself good but is in fact evil, courts art and artists as among his retinue of slaves whose task it is to satisfy its imagined needs [Scheinbedürfnissen]” (UM IV.8, 229).

20. Although this opens the gate to a very contentious and important theme in Nietzsche’s early and late philosophy, and one that, in my view, is linked to the concepts of “love of fate” and of “eternal recurrence”, I cannot provide a complete analysis of this idea in the space of this essay. The reader must bear in mind, then, that the remarks that follow will remain incomplete and partial. My hope is only to make the importance of this theme salient and to indicate what I take to be the correct direction that any proper interpretation of this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy should follow.

21. Nietzsche writes: “[Language] is no longer capable of performing that function for the sake of which alone it exists: to enable suffering mankind to come to an understanding with one another over the simplest needs of life. Man can no longer express his needs and distress by means of language, thus he can no longer really communicate at all […] As soon as men seek to come to an understanding with one another, and to unite for a common work, they are seized by the madness of universal concepts, indeed even by the mere sounds of words, and, as a consequence of this incapacity to communicate, everything they do together bears the mark of this lack of mutual understanding, inasmuch as it does not correspond to their real needs but only to the hollowness of those tyrannical words and concepts” (UM IV.5, 214-15).

22. See UM III.1, 128; and also UM IV.1 and 5 (I cite the relevant passage from this last reference below), where the notion of necessity is similarly discussed in opposition to the notion of accident, arbitrariness or chance.

23. Using the language of the Meditations, one could also call this his drive to personhood or personality. Here it is likely that Nietzsche is appropriating, in his own idiosyncratic way, a concept found in the Romantic and German Idealist tradition, and particularly in the writings of Schiller. See, for example, Schiller 2004.
24. In this way, my position differs from that of virtually all commentators for whom wholeness is a matter of integrating the different features of the psyche into a coherent whole. As an example, see Paul Katsafanas 2011. In my view, Nietzschean wholeness is not about psychic integration, although I am willing to concede that perhaps this can be its most natural outcome. Instead, wholeness is about genuine freedom in the actions of a person: the goal is to ensure that one’s actions are genuinely one’s own and not the expression of a slavish adherence to external authorities that actually stand in the way of one’s independence. In fairness to writers like Katsafanas, I should say that at least some of them also want to associate wholeness to freedom, or to some concept of agential control or ownership of one’s actions. Their approach, however, is to suggest that mental wholeness is the prerequisite condition (whether necessary or sufficient) for that kind of agential freedom, whereas, under my interpretation, for Nietzsche, to be free is to be whole, an achievement that does not necessarily require mental integration of the sort these other interpreters envision. I discuss my disagreement with the traditional interpretation of this ideal in the next section.

25. Again, although I cannot pursue this line of inquiry fully, I do want to indicate that in my mind this aspect of the Nietzschean ideal of wholeness bears some close resemblances to Kant’s own notion of normative necessity, like that encountered in the moral law. In my mind the link is to be found in the way in which both thinkers thought that the ideal of freedom or humanity could provide a reason for action that the agent would recognize as necessarily authoritative, that is, as being required of him no matter what sensible makeup he happens to have, or what age he is born into, or what society he belongs to, and so on. Pursuing this connection, however, is a topic for another essay.

26. In section 5 of the Third Meditation, Nietzsche calls these people true men. I take it that this is meant to indicate that in these people content and form truly correspond to one another, that is, that they represent genuine (and not false) personalities in which inwardness is truly revealed. In the same section, Nietzsche claims that these individuals (the philosophers, artists, and saints) lift the rest of us from the stream of sociability in which we live in constant flight from ourselves, the stream of labor and haste that keeps us submerged in an incessant fear of memory and of turning inward (UM III.5, 159).

27. That the genius is a placeholder for these three types can be established by comparing Nietzsche’s various statements concerning the task of culture. As we will see, in a passage I will cite shortly, he explicitly describes this task as the production of the genius: UM III.6, 163. But he also puts the point thus: “[the idea of culture] sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artists and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work, at the perfecting of nature” (UM III.5, 160; I cite the passage again below). This may serve as an example of the type of intra-textual comparative analysis that I have claimed is needed to make sense of Nietzsche’s somewhat loose conceptual usage throughout the Meditations (see note 14).

28. The thought is not only present in the early Nietzsche, but also in the late one as well; see, for example, Z I. Prologue (9); Z III.12 (26); GM III.9.

29. In the Fourth Meditation Nietzsche speaks of the two acts of purification or consecration that Wagner had to perform to become whole: first, to liberate himself, and then to liberate art. See UM IV.6, 220.

30. This is the way, for instance, that Thomas Hurka understands it. He thinks that Nietzsche is a perfectionist in the sense that he advocates a maximax principle that requires all agents to maximize the perfection of the most exceptional agents. See, Hurka 2007.

31. In his essay on the Third Meditation, James Conant also correctly argues that Nietzsche’s focus on the genius is not meant to be elitist and that the term stands for the productive uniqueness that each human being harbors within himself (Conant 2001, 224-225). However, his own interpretation fails to connect the development of the genius in oneself with the project of unifying one’s content and one’s form and is, thus, silent with respect to the ideal of wholeness that lies at the heart of the concept of the genius. Indeed, for Conant, Nietzsche does not prescribe any content to the ideal he is recommending (Conant 2001, 216-217). On my interpretation, by contrast, there is a specific content to the ideal: one can only work at the production of the genius in oneself by means of a struggle on behalf of genuine culture, that is, by devoting one’s efforts to the promotion of that realm that sustains one’s genius in the first place and makes it possible, the realm of culture in which freedom is preserved and guaranteed.
for all. To be sure, the form that the struggle must take is not something Nietzsche prescribes, since it will vary depending on the person’s talents and the milieu in which he lives: some will struggle on behalf of culture by promoting great music in which genuine feeling is made audible again; others by pursuing political conquests and reforms that seek to free and unify all nations; others by transvaluing values; and so on. Still, as will become clear shortly, even with respect to the form of the act itself there is some prescriptive content to Nietzsche’s view, since he suggests that the struggle consists in combating the oppositions and divisions that keep society and the individuals in them fragmented. The struggle, then, is a struggle for wholeness in the world, which means, in the interpretation I am defending here, a struggle for the perfecting of freedom and autonomy, or the perfecting of one’s own and other’s humanity.

32. Consider also the following: “[Schopenhauer] teaches us to distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so: how neither riches nor honours nor erudition can lift the individual out of the profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the striving after these valued things acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring goal: to acquire power so as to aid in the evolution of the physis and to be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone” (UM III.3, 142; emphasis added).

33. In this respect, my account conflicts with the interpretation defended by Huskinson. Although, she correctly attributes the task of unifying opposites to wholeness, for her this is principally a psychic project consisting in attempting to harmonize the relation between the rational and irrational aspects of the personality (Huskinson claims that for Nietzsche the former elements are metaphorically represented by the figure of Apollo and the later by that of Dionysus). According to Huskinson, this unification (perhaps paradoxically) is not really a unifying of these forces, but consists rather in their being balanced out or harmonized with one another, yet in a way that keeps the conflict between them alive (Huskinson 2004, 3; 24-27; 29-31). In my view, it is unclear from Huskinson’s account what this balancing act entails exactly or what the negotiation is like between the opposing forces, given that they can never really unify. Nevertheless, be that as it may, the important point is that on my interpretation the opposing forces do not reside primarily in the individual himself, in his psyche, but first and foremost in the world. Moreover, these forces do not necessarily divide neatly into rational and irrational powers, as Huskinson would have us believe. They can consist of all sorts of things like the historical, unhistorical, and suprahistorical faculties or powers, as is argued in the Second Meditation; or, as in the case under consideration, music and language; or, as I will indicate below, reason, the senses, feeling, and the will. In my judgment, what all these different oppositions have in common is that their continued presence constitutes an obstacle to the formation of a living unity of content and form, that is, to the formation of individual and societal wholeness. This is why, for Nietzsche, the person who wants to become whole and seeks thereby to make his society whole, will have to combat these oppositions and to reconcile the forces that threaten to perpetuate conditions of fragmentation and division.

34. The discussion that follows was prompted and inspired by a question posed to me by Fred Neuhausser during my presentation of an earlier version of this paper for the 18th International Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society that met in London in 2011. I thank him for pressing me on the issue and forcing me to clarify my position regarding this problem.

35. For good examples of this view see, Katsafanas 2011, Reginster 2003, Gemes 2009, Richardson 2005.

36. Nietzsche sometimes describes greatness of soul as consisting in precisely this kind of inner conflict; see, for instance, GM I.16 and also BGE 200.

37. In this respect, my account is in conflict with Katsafanas ingenious but, I believe, mistaken characterization of Nietzschean wholeness as a matter of achieving a harmonious relation between the agent’s reflective thought and his affects; see, Katsafanas 2011. Katsafanas sees Schiller’s influence on Nietzsche in this respect. In particular, he believes Nietzsche was attracted to Schiller’s conception of freedom as beauty and to some extent gripped by the latter’s preoccupation with developing a beautiful soul in which the demands of morality and reason align perfectly with the agent’s sensibility. But Schiller’s preoccupation with eschewing a tyrannical relation between reason and sensibility strikes
me as the sort of concern that Nietzsche would consider a mere slavish obsession, one that sees all domination as inherently objectionable. For him, such concerns betray a form of life-negation. For, lest we forget, even the early Nietzsche conceives of life itself as a fundamentally tyrannical, exploitative affair, in which various forces, individuals, institutions, drives, and so on, attempt to control and dominate each other, by forcing each other into new directions and purposes (more so the later Nietzsche; see BGE 22 and 259; also GM II.12). Moreover, Nietzsche often describes freedom and spirituality as resulting directly from such tyrannical influences and dominations (BGE 188; and TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 38 and 41). Thus, contrary to what Katsafanas argues, I would regard Nietzsche as being closer to Kant than to Schiller in this respect (which is not to say that there is no influence from Schiller in Nietzsche’s early works; it is just that I do not think that the influence is exerted in the direction Katsafanas pursues). Of course, it is important to keep in mind that the tyranny of reason over sensibility would not worry Nietzsche only insofar as such tyrannizing is done for the sake of pursuing the goals of freedom and autonomy. If reason behaves like a tyrant purely for the sake of tyrannizing, then the subjugation of one’s own inclinations would not lead to their spiritualization, but would amount instead to mere castration of the sort that cannot really engender the future or lead to (pro)creative action in the world.

38. As Katsafanas correctly notes, this seems to be the issue that has guided most of the debate in the literature (Katsafanas 2011: 92). Of course, Katsafanas himself falls prey to this tendency since he too interprets the issue as being about psychic integration. He seems to fall on the side of those who think that unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom. His account, however, is a bit more complicated because it rests on a distinction he introduces at the beginning of his essay, between actions that are in the agent’s control and actions that are free. Unfortunately, Katsafanas does not really elaborate on this distinction, yet it is one that, I think, in the end introduces tensions in his argument that he never fully resolves. One place where I perceive some of these tensions is in his attempt to argue that the mere presence of discord between an agent’s reflective judgments (reason) and his affects (sensibility) does not suffice to make an agent disunified, and, therefore, would not prevent the agent from being in control of his actions (Katsafanas 2011, 107); a position that obviously does not sit well with his earlier insistence that Nietzschean unity requires harmony between reason and the affects, even if not between the affects themselves (Katsafanas 2011, 103). In the end I am not convinced that Katsafanas’s appeal to a Frankfurtean notion of wholehearted endorsement of one’s motivations is able to resolve the tension between the different senses of unity that he wants to reconcile; a tension that, I suspect, springs from his attempt to divorce Nietzschean wholeness from the notion of freedom. In the common sense understanding of autonomy, an action that is under the agent’s control (i.e., autonomous) is thereby also a free act. This is why autonomy is fundamentally a moral faculty that allows actions to be morally imputable to an agent: they are imputable to him and he is morally liable for them, because they were under his control and he was free not to author them. But Katsafanas thinks that Nietzsche was opposed to the notion of free will that is contained in this standard idea of autonomy, since there are many passages where Nietzsche calls this idea false and fictitious. Thus, he attempts to characterize the capacity to control one’s own behavior (autonomy), without recourse to notions of freedom. I do not share Katsafanas’s concern, because I think that for Nietzsche it does not matter whether the notion of autonomous free action is actually metaphysically true (indeed, as Nietzsche remarks, the falsity of a belief is not an argument against it, what matters is its uses and effects for life; see BGE 4). We take ourselves to be metaphysically free and the originators of our actions, and our imagining ourselves to be so, compounded with the aspiration we have (or can have) to live up to this image, in a way makes it so: it modifies our actual behavior in the world by way of influencing it to conform to the image that we have of ourselves as the free originators of that behavior. A full defense of these ideas in Nietzsche’s philosophy requires more space that I can devote to it here. Let me say that I see Nietzsche’s position in this respect as kindred to that articulated and defended by David Velleman in his work on the philosophy of action; see, for instance, his “Motivation by Ideal”, in Velleman 2006.

39. My analysis of the ideal of wholeness also allows us to see that the figures of the artist, the philosopher, and the saint that Nietzsche
raises as examples of wholeness, have a kind of metaphorical significance in his account: they can be seen as representing three different aspects of the act of self-revelation that makes one whole. The philosopher represents the legislative power that becomes manifested in the act: the power that says, “thus it shall be” against the blind (accidental) compulsion of the “thus it is” of reality (UM II.8, 106; UM III.3, 144-146, UM III.5, 158-159 and UM III.6, 163; also much later, and perhaps more clearly expressed in BGE 211); the artist represents the creative and symbolic power of the deed that collects into a comprehensive and simplifying image both what came before and what, through the act itself, will come later in the future, by synthesizing and compelling things that seemed irreconcilable to come together for a higher purpose (UM II.6, 163; UM IV.4, 212-213, UM IV.5, 214); and, finally, the saint represents the redeeming power of wholeness that is manifested in the manner in which the external deed the person performs becomes part of the chain of greatness that will continue to live past his own physical demise, and through which he can feel identified and unified with all of humanity (UM II.2, 68-69; UM III.5, 161).

40. See, Clark 1990.
41. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche claims that nationalism is “the most anticultural sickness and unreason there is” (EH III, Case of Wagner, 2).
42. For a more recent but similar reading of this passage, see Rutherford 2011, 534.
43. And, again, in my mind, part of the reason he has become necessary in this way is that Goethe can now function as an eternal model for the kind of ideal (the ideal of a free personality) that can give a living agent authoritative guidance: the sort of guidance that he cannot really forestall if he is going to become free himself (become a genius).
44. I am referring to interpretations like those made famous and, perhaps, best defended by Brian Leiter; see Leiter 2002.
45. For example, May 1999, 20-21; Richardson 1996, 212; and, more recently, Rutherford 2011, 513, 523, and 534.
46. An earlier version of this paper was presented by invitation at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Denver in 2008, and was accepted for the 18th International Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society at the University of London in 2011. I thank attendants at both events for their questions and feedback.

References

List of abbreviations

UM = Untimely Meditations, Hollingdale tr. (Cambridge, 1997)
BT = Birth of Tragedy, Kaufmann tr. (New York, 1967)
HAH = Human, All-Too Human, Hollingdale tr. (Cambridge, 1996)
Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Kaufmann tr. (New York, 1954)
GM = On the Genealogy of Morals, Kaufmann tr. (New York, 1967)
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, Kaufmann tr. (New York, 1966)
TI = Twilight of the Idols, Kaufmann tr. (New York, 1954)
EH = Ecce Homo, Kaufmann tr. (New York, New York, 1967)
The numbers following the abbreviation refer to section, chapter, and/or part numbers. In the case of UM, which I use extensively, I have also included page number to aid the reader in accessing the citation more directly.


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